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OVERVIEW 
The crux of General Motors1 argument is that a stone 
could not become lodged in the pinch point between the flexible 
coupling and the end retainer nut, causing a total loss of 
steering. In reviewing this Reply Brief, the appellants ask this 
Court to weigh heavily the uncontested fact that the driver, Wayne 
Nay, could not turn the vehicle to the left. 
The investigations conducted by each of the appellants1 
expert witnesses indicated that the wheels of the vehicle were 
pointed straight ahead as the vehicle went over the cliff. (T. 
Vol. I, p. 135, 1. 5-17; p. 16, 1. 1-18). These witnesses' 
testimony was corroborated by the investigating officer's report. 
(T. Exhibits 21-22). 
Furthermore, the only surviving eye witness to the 
accident, Matthew Nay, testified that he saw his granduncle trying 
in vain to turn the steering wheel, but that the steering wheel 
would not turn left. (T. Vol. I, p. 61, 1. 11-13; p. 66, 1. 10-
15). Moreover, the driver's dying words were that the "goddamn 
truck didn't turn" (T. Vol. I, p. 84, 1. 11-13). 
The fact that Wayne Nay could not turn the vehicle is the 
most crucial fact surrounding this litigation. General Motors has 
not specifically addressed this fact, but rather has alleged that 
the fact is irrelevant. (Brief of Appellee, p. 6) . But the 
appellants urge upon this Court a different interpretation of the 
facts of this case. Wayne Nay could not turn the steering wheel 
left. There is no dispute on that point. The question is why he 
could not turn the steering wheel. The appellants ask the Court to 
keep this fact and issue foremost in their mind when reviewing the 
facts of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
General Motors asserts in its Statement of Facts that 
each of the appellants1 expert witnesses searched for witness marks 
but could find none. (Brief of the Appellee, p. 7) . This 
mischaracterizes the testimony of these witnesses. David Stephens 
was the first witness to handle the steering coupling components 
from the vehicle involved in the accident. When asked at trial 
whether he could find witness marks, he responded that he noticed 
none but that he was not looking for such marks during his initial 
examination because he was unsure of the cause of the accident at 
that time. (T. Vol. II, p. 53, 1. 2-9). 
Lindley Manning also did not look for witness marks when 
he first examined the steering coupling components because he 
didn't know the cause of the crash. (T. Vol. II., p. 15, 1. 9-16). 
Mr. Manning also viewed the photographs taken by Mr. Stephens, but 
could not discern witness marks because the photographs were taken 
at the wrong angle. (T.Vol. II., p. 15, 1. 17-25). 
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Dr. Ben Basye also did not look for witness marks when he 
viewed the photographs taken by David Stephens because he was 
unsure of the cause of the accident when he first saw the 
photographs. (T. Vol. II., p. 87. 1. 12-19). Furthermore, Mr. 
Stephens testified that the angle at which the photographs were 
taken would not show witness marks. (T. Vol. II, p. 64-66). 
General Motors1 assertion that the appellants1 witnesses were 
unable to find witness marks is wrong. These witnesses did not look 
for witness marks because the cause of the accident was unclear at 
the time the photographs were taken. Mr. Stephens has testified as 
follows about the witness marks: 
3. I was the first person to disassemble the 
steering gear from the Nay truck. At that 
time, I was not aware of the possibility of a 
rock or other foreign object getting in the 
area of the steering coupling and frame or 
gearbox end nut and cause steering limiting 
interference. I therefore did not look for 
marks which might have been left by such 
interference. By the time that I had become 
aware of the interference possibility, the 
steering coupling and end nut had been 
disposed of and were no longer available for 
examination. 
(See Affidavit of David Stephens, Ex. N. and T. Vol. II p. 52-53). 
General Motors1 allegations that there were no rocks or 
stones ont he road large enough to have jammed the steering, that 
"when plaintiffs1 experts manually inserted a rock in their 
candidate location, and allowed members of the jury to attempt to 
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turn the steering wheel, the rock always broke or popped loose and, 
that "the average man can easily exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on 
the steering wheel, which translates to 3000 pounds of force on the 
rock" are not supported by the record and are all without merit. 
The rocks used in the test before the jury were from the 
scene of the accident. Mr. Manning testified as follows: 
A. That's two of the rocks that we picked up at the 
scene with Mr. Stephens when I was there. 
Q. And for the record, those are the same rocks that 
you used in this demonstration with the jury? 
A. I used one with the jury and the other one was the 
one we worked with last night. (T. Vol. 1 p. 27: 
22-25; 28: 1-2) 
Of the eight jurors who felt the resistance of the 
steering wheel when the rock was inserted between the flexible 
coupling and the end retainer nut, only one or two jurors, both 
women, who turned the steering wheel hard to the left, were able to 
dislodge or break the rock. 
Mr. Hansen: Your Honor, I'm wondering if we 
might ask that the jury have an opportunity to 
feel how much resistance is ont he steering 
wheel? 
The Court: Any objection? 
Mr. Clegg: I have none. 
The Court: You may, you can step down 
individually, come down and attempt to turn 
the wheel. 
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Mr. Hansen: Is it possible that somebody 
could turn real hard and overcome that. 
(This last statement was made after five or six of the eight jurors 
had attempted to turn the steering wheel without success.) 
The Witness: I would think that if you pushed 
hard enough, I don't know what strength it 
would take for the strength of that particular 
rock. But it's pretty solidly wedged in 
there. 
Q. (By Mr. Hansen) What if you turn the wheel back 
this other direction? 
A. It would fall right out. 
Q. (By Mr. Hansen) You can use both hands. 
A. You did break a piece off the rock, too. This one 
may not be the right shape any more. 
Mr. Clegg: The record show the women are 
doing much better then the men? 
(T. Vol 1. p. 25: 19-25; 26: 1-17) 
It should be kept in mind that if a driver is proceeding 
down a narrow mountain road at about 40-50 miles on an hour with a 
severe drop-off to the right that if he all of a sudden had a 
problem in turning the steering wheel to the left, that the 
reasonably prudent driver would continue exerting force to the left 
but would not turn hard to left for fear of over correcting and 
over turning once the steering wheel broke free and he would not 
turn the steering wheel to the right because of the severe drop-
off. Being on the road in a real life situation where there is 
danger of losing your life is different than being in the courtroom 
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where there is no such danger. A steering wheel is a sensitive 
instrument which requires only a slight turn in order to direct the 
wheels. Thus, a driver does not generally turn the steering wheel 
hard to the left or the right when the steering is jammed in a real 
life situation. The driver is faced with an emergency situation and 
is only expected to do what a reasonably prudent person would have 
done under those circumstances. It is a jury question. 
General Motors' allegation that "the average man can 
easily exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on the steering wheel" also 
is without merit. Dr. Basye has testified as follows: 
To exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on a 
steering wheel, 14 inches in diameter, which 
is similar to the Nay vehicle, one would have 
to push up with 171 pounds with one hand and 
down with 171 pounds with the other hand in 
the opposite direction. 
(171 pounds) times (14/12 feet) = 200 foot-pounds 
It is false to state that the average male can 
do this! 
(Affidavit of Ben Basye, Exhibit 0) 
Just because General Motors says it, doesn't make it true. 
Mr. Manning further testified as to other items that 
could have been responsible for jamming the steering ont he Nay 
vehicle. 
Q. We have just been talking about rocks. Are there 
other items other than rocks that could catch int 
he flexible coupling? 
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A. Well, anything of a somewhat similar size would do 
it. Of course, there's a lot of coal around the 
edge of that road from being handled there. There 
would be a piece of wood, a bolt head, or any piece 
that fell off a car, or who knows what else. Any 
kind of a foreign object that is fairly hard and of 
approximately the right size or have part of it the 
right size could get in there. 
Q. Do you think you would be able to, if you will, put 
a rock in and show the steering interference to the 
jury? 
A. Yes. 
(T. Vol. 1. p. 24: 22-25; 25: 1-10) 
Mr. Manning further testified as to what could be done to 
correct the defect in the General Motors' trucks similar to the Nay 
vehicle. 
Q. Mr. Manning, based on your engineering experience, 
could the mechanical defect you say existed in the 
Nay vehicle, have been corrected? 
A. Yes. It could have. 
Q. How could that problem have been corrected? 
A. Well, to me, the best way to correct it is to 
eliminate the pinch point making the lower hub on 
the steering—could have made the flexible coupling 
longer so that the coupling was farther from the 
steering box, would have been one way of doing it. 
* * * 
A . . . Another way might have been to reverse the 
ears on that end retainer nut so the didn't stick 
up and form a pinch point with the flexible 
coupling. 
* * * 
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A And then the other thing would be some kind of 
guard to keep foreign material out or of any sort 
out of there. 
* * * 
Q . . . Can you give us some kind of idea as to how 
much expense would be involved in these 
corrections? 
A . . . About the only thing I can do is reiterate 
what has been told to me and in one of the 
depositions in this case, that plastic guard in a 
similar situation—another vehicle entirely, was 
something less than a dollar in cost. 
(T. Vol. 1 p. 28: 3-12, 19-21; 29: 14-16; 30: 12-14, 15-19) 
Dr. Ben Basye and David Stephens have testified as 
follows concerning what General Motors has done with regard to the 
pinch point between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut 
since the September 20, 1986 accident involving the 1986 GM truck 
which Wayne Nay purchased new on July 3, 1986: 
4. It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle 
accident was most probably caused by a rock or 
other foreign object becoming lodged in the 
pinch points associated with the exposed 
proximity of the flexible coupling and the end 
retainer nut, preventing the driver from 
steering the vehicle. 
5. Beginning in 1988, General Motors trucks 
including Chevrolet pickup trucks, have been 
redesigned wherein corrective action has been 
taken to overcome the problem discussed in 
paragraph four. 
6. Specifically, General Motors has placed a 
plastic shield over the exposed region of the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. 
This plastic shield, by preventing foreign 
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objects from becoming lodged in the pinch 
points, will help eliminate the defect which 
existed on the Nay vehicle, 
(See Affidavit of Ben Basye, Exhibit 0) 
4. I have found that, prior to the date of 
manufacture of the Nay truck, General Motors 
has protected against such interference by 
foreign objects by placing a plastic guard 
over the steering coupling in its passenger 
vehicles but not in its trucks. 
5. I have also learned that General Motors 
has, since the date of manufacture of the Nay 
truck, placed a plastic guard over the 
steering coupling in its trucks which protects 
against interference by foreign objects, and 
re-designed the steering gear end nut, 
eliminating ears which, in my testing, proved 
to be a major catch point on the gearbox end 
when test rocks were inserted into the space 
between the gearbox end and coupling. 
(See Affidavit of David Stephens, Exhibit N) 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED 
VERDICT TO GENERAL MOTORS ON THE ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY 
A. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ONLY PERMITS THIS COURT TO EVALUATE 
APPELLANTS1 EVIDENCE. 
In their original brief, the appellants outlined the 
evidence presented at trial which supported their claim of strict 
liability against General Motors. (Brief of the Appellants, pp. 12-
23). In their brief, General Motors uses cross-examination 
testimony from the appellants1 expert witness and direct testimony 
from its own expert witnesses in an attempt to discredit the 
appellants1 theory of how the accident occurred. (Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 15-28). 
Under this Court's prior holdings, the use of such 
testimony is improper. In Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 3 39, 
431 P.2d 566 (1967), this Court defined the scope of available 
testimony when reviewing a directed verdict: 
In disposing of a post verdict motion as well 
as in directed verdicts, all of the testimony 
and all reasonable inferences flowing 
therefrom which tend to prove the plaintiff's 
case must be accepted as true, and all 
conflicts and all evidence which tends to 
disprove it must be disregarded. 
Koer, 19 Utah 2d, at 342, 431 P.2d at 569 (citations omitted). 
Here, the appellants sought to establish General Motors' 
liability using the testimony of three witnesses that were 
qualified as experts. If their testimony is credible, which must 
be accepted for purposes of this appeal, there is little doubt that 
the appellants stated a cause of action against General Motors in 
strict liability. 
General Motors' motive in presenting defense evidence to 
this Court is clear. General Motors hopes that this Court will 
weigh the evidence and discredit the appellants' expert witness 
testimony, ultimately holding that General Motors was entitled to 
the directed verdict. However, under this Court's prior 
jurisprudence weighing of the evidence and credibility 
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determinations are not within this Court's function. Finlavson v. 
Brady. 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). 
However, the testimony presented in General Motors1 brief 
does serve some purpose in this case. The testimony illustrates 
that there are several issues of fact which could only be 
determined by a jury. The appellants were denied their opportunity 
for a jury determination when the trial court instructed the jury 
to return a verdict with an insufficient number of concurring 
jurors.1 
B. THE JURY'S SPLIT WAS RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH THAT REASONABLE 
JURORS COULD DISAGREE AS TO THE EVIDENCE. 
General Motors argues that the jury's disagreement is 
irrelevant to this appeal. (Brief of Appellee, p. 28) . However, the 
jury's experience here is directly relevant to the standard of 
review employed by this Court. Before the trial court could grant 
1
 An example from General Motors brief serves to illustrate 
this point. One page 18 of its brief, General Motors asserts that 
the appellants relied on "pictures of the accident scene which were 
subject to various interpretations (exhibits 13, 29, 81, 90, 96-
102; Reide direct, 262-63, 270-74)." Assuming that General Motors 
is correct and the pictures are subject to various interpretations, 
could the trial court properly resolve those varying 
interpretations in favor or General Motors, rather than allow the 
jury to conclude what interpretation should be given to the 
photographs? This is but one of many factual disputes which 
required a jury determination. In light of these many disputes, the 
trial court should not have taken the case from the jury and 
granted a directed verdict to General Motors. 
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a directed verdict to General Motors it had to conclude that no 
reasonable juror could find for the appellants on the basis of the 
evidence presented. Management Comm. v. Greystone Pines, 652 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1986); Anderson v. Gribble. 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 
(1973); Rhiness v. Dansie. 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
The appellants1 argument is simply evidentiary. Here, 
the jurors did reach different conclusions as to the evidence 
presented, which is indicative that the trial court too readily 
concluded that the evidence would not permit a verdict for the 
appellants. 
C. STONE INTERFERENCE WAS THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT 
The bulk of General Motors' brief is spent asserting that 
the stone interference theory is invalid and that "[n]o competent 
mechanical engineer could espouse the theory plaintiffs were then 
espousing, . . . " (Brief of Appellee, p. 19 n. 4). This argument 
deserves a fuller treatment. 
The appellants presented two accident reconstruction 
expert witnesses, Lindley Manning and Dr. Ben Basye. Each 
concluded not only could a stone become lodged between the flexible 
coupling and the end retainer nut, but also that a stone did lodge 
in the Nay vehicle's steering coupling, causing a total loss of 
steering and a fatal crash. (T. Vol. I, p. 12, 1. 9-20; T. Vol. I, 
p. 218, 1. 22-25). Both these witnesses had been qualified as 
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experts in the field of mechanical engineering and accident 
reconstruction analysis, and Dr. Basye was a tenured professor at 
the University of Missouri school of engineering. General Motors 
is free to discredit the testimony presented by these witnesses, 
but in no manner is General Motors justified in concluding that 
these witnesses are not competent2. 
But Mr. Manning and Dr. Basye were not alone in their 
conclusion that stone interference was possible and the cause of 
the accident. The Value Engineering Laboratory conducted extensive 
testing regarding stone interference in the steering coupling. The 
final report from that study, "Valuation of the Steering of 
Obstruction Problems Conducted for the Insurance Institute of 
Highway Safety", was presented to the jury. (Trial Exhibit 6). The 
study concluded that: "[I]t was demonstrated that under some 
driving conditions on gravel surfaces, gravel is kicked up into the 
steering coupling." The report includes photographs of stones 
lodged inside the steering coupling. This report not only 
2
 General Motors accuses the appellants of relying upon 
"purchased" testimony. (Brief of Appellee, p. 26) . This is an odd 
accusation considering the witnesses presented by General Motors. 
Gerald Confer testified at trial to having appeared on behalf of 
General Motors in over 100 trials. (T. Vol. II, p. 228, 1. 5-11). 
Pete Reide admitted to having testified at over 20 trials. (T. 
Vol. II, p. 279, 1. 12-18). General Motors1 accusations regarding 
"purchased" testimony can best be characterized as the "pot calling 
the kettle black." Furthermore, whatever inferences General Motors 
seeks to have this Court apply to the appellants' expert witnesses 
must be applied equally to General Motors1 witnesses. 
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substantiates the appellants' theory as to the cause of the 
accident, but also indicates that General Motors is wrong in its 
conclusion that no competent mechanical engineer could espouse the 
stone interference theory. 
Despite this study produced after extensive testing, 
General Motors continues to maintain that the appellants1 experts 
are not competent. But one look at the evidence presented at trial 
indicates that the only mechanical engineers which did not accept 
the stone interference theory were those presented by General 
Motors. 
Furthermore, by arguing that stone interference is 
impossible, General Motors ignores its own history of stone 
interference. (General Motors was able to contend at trial that 
stone interference was impossible because the 1973 recall 
statements were excluded.) In 1973, General Motors recalled over 
three million vehicles due to stone interference in the steering 
coupling, the same defect at issue before this Court today. In 
both instances, a stone could become lodged between the flexible 
coupling and a non-moving part, causing a loss of steering 
capability. Despite recalling almost four million vehicles in 1973 
for stone interference, General Motors is asserting that stone 
interference is impossible. Such inconsistencies run throughout 
General Motors1 brief. 
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General Motors has taken corrective action to remedy the 
stone interference problem. Beginning in 1988, General Motors began 
to place shields over the flexible coupling and end retainer nut in 
the steering column in order to eliminate the danger of stone 
interference. (See Affidavits of Ben Basye and David Stephens, 
attached as Exhibits 0 and N, respectively.) One cannot help but 
ask: If there is no danger of a stone becoming lodged between the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, why place a shield over 
this area in the steering column to avoid the non-existent danger? 
(While this evidence was excluded at trial as evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures, General Motors should not be allowed 
to discredit the appellants' expert witnesses for espousing a 
theory which just two years after the accident General Motors 
itself espoused. In other words, General Motors should not be 
entitled to hide behind the subsequent measures shield while at the 
same time using the defense as a sword to attack the credibility of 
witnesses for advancing a theory they themselves espouse.) 
Also, General Motors has recently eliminated the "ears" 
on the end retainer nut. (See Affidavit of David Stephens, Exhibit 
N). By eliminating these ears, the possibility of stone 
interference is greatly reduced. (Id.) This was one of the 
measures the appellants' expert witness, Lindley Manning, testified 
at trial could eliminate the problem. (T. Vol. I, p. 29, 1. 3-13). 
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Once again, while General Motors is claiming before this Court that 
stone interference is impossible, it is taking action to eliminate 
the "impossible" risk. 
Finally, there is Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 
1373 (5th Cir. 1973). General Motors has asserted throughout this 
litigation that it was impossible for the right set of 
circumstances to occur such that a stone could lodge between the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. (Brief of Appellee, p. 
26-27). Furthermore, according to General Motors, even if a stone 
could find its way to the steering coupling, the stone would break 
or pop free before the steering was affected. (Id.) However, 
General Motors has attached an affidavit to their brief, signed by 
their own attorney in the Lowe case, stating that a stone did lodge 
in the steering coupling. (Brief of Appellee, Exhibit F). This 
stone could not be dislodged by the force placed on the coupling by 
the driver steering the vehicle, nor did the stone break or pop 
free. 
The inconsistencies in General Motors1 argument are 
apparent. First General Motors urges upon this Court that no 
competent mechanical engineer could espouse the appellants1 stone 
interference explanation of the accident. In doing so, General 
Motors ignores the testimony of the appellants1 competent expert 
witnesses, the study conducted by the Value Engineering Laboratory, 
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its own experience with stone interference in 1973, and measures 
introduced in 1988 to eliminate the danger. 
Second, General Motors asserts that even if a stone found 
its way to the steering coupling, it could not lodge in the 
steering coupling. General Motors assures us that the stone would 
either break or pop free. But General Motors' attorney testifies 
to this Court in a specially prepared affidavit that a stone did 
become lodged in the pinch point between the flexible coupling and 
the end retainer nut. The stone did not break. The stone did not 
pop loose. Rather, the stone caused a total loss of steering and 
a deadly crash. Simply put, General Motors1 argument fails under 
the weight of internal inconsistencies. 
The appellants will conclude here as they did at trial. 
General Motors has admitted that, on average, one million new 
trucks are manufactured by General Motors each year. (T. Vol. II, 
p. 289, 1. 5-12). Each of these vehicles travels approximately 
12,000 miles per year. (T. Vol. II, p. 289, 1. 17-20). Thus, in 
any one year, General Motors pickup trucks travel over twelve 
billion miles. Appellant's experts testified that it may be a 
"chance in a million" that a stone would become lodged in the pinch 
point between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. 
However, if the possibility that a stone could become lodged inside 
the steering coupling is one in a million, that possibility rises 
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to a near statistical certainty over time (at least a reasonable 
probability) when considering the massive number of miles these 
vehicles travel each year. For example, 1 chance in 1,000,000 is 
the same as 12,000 chances in 12,000,000,000. In other words, 
based on the average miles driven in these GM trucks every year, if 
a stone interferes with the steering mechanism 1 time in every 1 
million miles, it is a statistical certainty to occur 12,000 times 
each year. At least four members of the jury concluded that if the 
defect could be fixed, which it could by designing around it or 
placing a plastic shield over it, that it should be fixed and thus 
avoid entirely the risk that 12,000 times every year a stone will 
become lodged in the steering mechanism and completely preclude a 
driver's ability to steer his vehicle. What driver wants to expose 
himself and his family to that kind of a risk which can cause 
serious injury or death when the risk can be completely eliminated 
altogether at a minimal cost. When considering the evidence 
presented by the appellants at trial, the trial court erred in 
concluding that no reasonable juror could find for the appellants. 
The appellants ask this Court to reverse the trial court's directed 
verdict in favor of General Motors. 
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XI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF 
GENERAL MOTORS' 1973 RECALL OF PASSENGER CARS 
DESIGNED SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE NAY 
VEHICLE, 
A. THE NAY VEHICLE WAS DESIGNED SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE 
RECALLED VEHICLES. 
The parties agree that before evidence of the 1973 
General Motors1 recall can be admitted, the appellants must 
establish that the recalled vehicles and the Nay vehicle were 
substantially similar in design3. Hesson v. Jaguar Cars, 915 F.2d 
641 (11th Cir. 1990); Calhoun v. Honda Motor Co. , 738 F.2d 126 (6th 
Cir. 1984); Brief of Appellee, p. 30. In order to establish the 
similarity of the vehicles, the appellants provided testimony from 
their own expert witness, Dr. Ben Basye, and from the defense 
expert witness, Gerald Confer. In their brief, General Motors 
argues that these witnesses actually testified that the component 
parts were similar, but the designs were not. (Brief of Appellee, 
p. 33) . However, a close reading of these witnesses testimony 
3
 General Motors argues that the evidence should be excluded 
if the prejudice to General Motors outweighs the recall statements 
relevancy. However, General Motors does not argue before this 
Court that admission of the recall statements would be prejudicial 
to it, nor did General Motors argue prejudice before the trial 
court. Therefore, the appellants do not argue the point, with the 
minor exception of citing Barry v. Manqlass, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870 
(1976), wherein the court held that the relevancy of recall 
statements will seldom be outweighed by prejudice. 
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indicates that both witnesses considered the design of the Nay 
vehicle to be similar to the design of the recalled vehicles. 
Dr. Ben Basye testified through affidavit4 as follows: 
4. The Saginaw steering system used in 
the 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup truck driven 
by Wayne Nay (Hereinafter the "Nay" vehicle) 
was mechanically and functionally essentially 
equivalent to the steering system used in the 
3,707,064 General Motors automobiles which 
were recalled in 1973 (NHTSA Recall Campaign 
No. 73-0013). 
5. There existed pinch points on the Nay 
vehicle's steering system that constituted the 
same potential hazard which led to the recall 
of the 3,707,064 General Motors cars in 1973. 
6. It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle 
accident was most probably caused by a rock or 
other foreign object becoming lodged in the 
pinch points associated with the exposed 
proximity of the flexible coupling and the end 
retainer nut, preventing the driver from 
steering the vehicle. 
7. The steering parts on the NHTSA Recall 
(No. 73-0013) cars and the Nay's GMC vehicle 
are functionally equivalent, resulting in the 
same potential hazard; namely a pinch point 
between a part that must rotate and a fixed 
part preventing the driver from steering the 
vehicle. 
(Affidavit of C. Ben Basye, attached as Exhibit Q). Dr. Basye is 
testifying that the designs are similar to the extent that the same 
hazard exists in both designs—the location of the flexible 
4
 This affidavit was included as an exhibit in the appellants' 
memorandum in opposition to General Motors' Motion in Limine. The 
affidavit is therefore already included in the record below. 
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coupling in close proximity to a non-movable part, allowing for a 
stone to become lodged in the coupling, causing a loss of steering. 
The deposition testimony of General Motors1 own expert 
witness, Gerald Confer, is more revealing. Mr. Confer was being 
asked by appellants1 counsel whether he had conducted tests to 
determine if stone interference was possible: 
Q. So you have done it on several 
occasions? 
A. I have done it wherever we are under 
the circumstances, and I demonstrated it 
in many, many instances, but the 
instances I'm referring to would be with 
the B car which was the subject of the 
recall. 
Q. And if I understand you correctly, you haven't 
actually got down and done that demonstration in 
regards to any trucks; is that correct? 
A. No. 
Q. But you are relying upon your experience with 
the B. cars? 
A. Well, if you want to relate now to the steering 
gear or the coupling, there's no difference between 
the B car and the truck, they're the same. 
(Deposition of Gerald Confer, p. 67-68). Mr. Confer indicates in 
this testimony that there is no need for him to conduct independent 
testing for stone interference on General Motors' trucks because 
the trucks are similar in design to the B cars recalled in 1973. 
Thus, the expert witnesses for both parties agree that the design 
21 
of the Nay truck is substantially similar to the design of the 
vehicles recalled in 1973. 
The crux of General Motors1 argument seems to be that the 
1973 recall involved stones lodged between the coupling and the 
frame. Having moved the frame, the defect is solved for now and all 
eternity. However, the appellants are arguing that the location of 
the flexible coupling in close proximity to a non-moving part 
constitutes a defect, whether the non-moving part is the frame or 
the end retainer nut. 
The recall notices are relevant evidence that General 
Motors was aware that a hazard was created when the flexible 
coupling was placed in close proximity to a non-moving part. In 
1973, the non-moving part was the frame. On the Nay vehicle, a 
1986 GMC pickup, the non-moving part was the end retainer nut. The 
recall notices are evidence that General Motors repeated the 
ultrahazardous design for which it should have learned its lesson 
in 1973. 
B. LOWE V. GENERAL MOTORS IS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
General Motors misunderstands the appellants1 use of the 
Fifth Circuit decision in Lowe v. General Motors, 624 F.2d 1373 
(5th Cir. 1980) . Indeed, General Motors goes so far as to 
introduce an affidavit to the effect that the Lowe case involved 
aspects not present in this appeal. (Brief of Appellee, Exhibit F) . 
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Through Lowe, the appellants sought to establish two 
principles: 1) that the 1973 recall statements are relevant as to 
whether the design of the Nay vehicle was defective; and 2) that 
exclusion of the recall statements was prejudicial to the 
appellants. Lowe establishes both of these propositions, while 
also establishing that there is no private cause of action under 
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 
The 1973 recall advised owners that a stone might become 
lodged between the flexible coupling and the frame. In Lowe, the 
plaintiffs alleged that a stone became lodged inside the coupling, 
between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut. (General 
Motors asserts that the case differs because the non-moving part 
was the frame. This is irrelevant because the stone, if the frame 
was absent, could eventually have lodged against the end retainer 
nut as the driver turned the wheel. In either case, the lodging 
could cause a total loss of steering.) The Fifth Circuit held: 
The risk of partial loss of steering due to a 
stone lodged between the coupling and the 
frame and the risk of a total loss of steering 
due to a stone lodged within the steering 
coupling are quite similar dangers. It is not 
unreasonable to infer that if GM knew of one 
risk, they might have known of the other. 
Lowe, 624 F.2d at 1382. 
The appellants seek introduction of the recall statements 
for the same purpose—to establish that a stone lodged within the 
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steering coupling is a danger to be guarded against with the same 
fervor as a stone lodged between the coupling and the frame. The 
jury here should have been allowed to evaluate the dangers involved 
in the recall just as the jury in Lowe was permitted to hear 
evidence of the recall. 
Lowe is also relevant regarding the prejudice incurred by 
the appellants when the trial court excluded the notices. In Lowe, 
the plaintiffs were allowed to introduce recall evidence and 
recovered $500,000 for the passenger's estate and $500,000 for the 
driver's estate. Barred from using the recall evidence in the 
second trial, the plaintiffs were non-suited. Here, the appellants 
were barred from using the recall evidence, and were non-suited. 
With the recall statements, the appellants may recover. 
Lowe demonstrates the powerful effect recall statements 
can have on the plaintiff's ability to meet their burden of proof. 
Here, as in Lowe, the plaintiffs were non-suited when deprived of 
the recall statements. Clearly, the exclusion of recall statements 
prejudiced the appellants in the case before the Court. 
Thus, while Lowe does discuss the nature of a private 
cause of action under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the decision 
also reaches issues relevant to this appeal, and therefore remains 
persuasive authority with this Court. 
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C. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
General Motors does not dispute the many policy 
considerations supporting admission of the recall statements set 
forth in the appellants' brief.5 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants ask this Court to reverse the trial 
court's directed verdict and order a new trial. The appellants 
further ask this Court to rule that the 1973 recall statements be 
admitted during the second trial. 
DATED this 3 £> day of September, 1991. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgan H 
* Rather, General Motors asserts that the recall 
statements should be excluded as evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures. (Brief of Appellee, p. 30, n. 5) . While on its face this 
argument may have some appeal, the vast majority of courts have 
ruled that recall notices should be admitted despite there nature 
as subsequent repair evidence. Farner v. Paccar. 562 F.2d 518 (8th 
Cir. 1977); Carey v. General Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 
1979); Millette v. Radosta. 404 N.E.2d 823 (111. App. 1980). These 
courts have ruled that the doctrine of subsequent repairs is 
inapplicable because the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1411, is mandatory in requiring disclosure of motor vehicle defects 
through a recall. See Rinker v. Ford Motor Co. . 567 S.W.2d 655, 
665 (Mo.App.1988). 
While the threat of possible litigation may provide an 
incentive for some manufacturers to avoid initiating recall 
campaigns, the stiff penalties provided under the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1398, up to $800,000 per violation, 
provide ample incentive for full disclosure to the vehicle owners 
of all defects. Having provided a incentive for the manufacturer 
to comply with the statute, there is no reason to exclude recall 
evidence under the doctrine of subsequent repairs. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of September, 1991, 
I caused a true and correct copy of APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be 
hand delivered to H. James Clegg, SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh 
Floor. P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as : 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and : 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually 
and as personal representative 
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN : 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and 
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of 
WAYNE NAY, : Appeal No. 910244 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC : 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID STEPHENS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David Stephens being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a qualified expert in accident reconstruction 
and failure analysis in the state of Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, 
California, Montana and Tennessee• 
2. On September 27, 1986, I examined the accident 
location at which, on September 20, 1986, Wayne Nay was in a truck 
accident, and, on September 29, 1986, I interviewed Matthew Nay, a 
passenger in the truck who was sitting next to Wayne Nay. The 
information which I gathered at the accident location and learned 
from Matthew Nay convinced me that the front wheels remained in a 
straight ahead mode (did not turn left) as the vehicle traveled 
from the road to the edge of the embankment. 
3. I was the first person to disassemble the steering 
gear from the Nay truck. At that time, I was not aware of the 
possibility of a rock or other foreign object getting in the area 
of the steering coupling and frame or gearbox end nut and cause 
steering limiting interference. I therefore did not look for marks 
which might have been left by such interference. By the time that 
I had become aware of the interference possibility, the steering 
coupling and end nut had been disposed of and were no longer 
available for examination. 
4. I have found that, prior to the date of manufacture 
of the Nay truck, General Motors has protected against such 
interference by foreign objects by placing a plastic guard over the 
steering coupling in its passenger vehicles but not in its trucks. 
5. I have also learned that General Motors has, since 
the date of manufacture of the Nay truck, placed a plastic guard 
over the steering coupling in its trucks which protects against 
interference by foreign objects, and re-designed the steering gear 
end nut, eliminating ears which, in my testing, proved to be a 
major catch point on the gearbox end when test rocks were inserted 
into the space between the gearbox end and coupling. 
6. The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge 
and if asked as a witness, I could and would testify to the same. 
DATED this ">/ day of September, 1991. 
<£^ >f* •v? 
David Stephens 
In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, on this 
day of September, 1991, before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared David Stephens who is personally know to me to 
be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document in my 
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is 
voluntary and the document truthful. 
My/Golftmissdbon Expires: 
;s >\ 
v - " — >* ' Sit 
\3 
Notary Public 
Residing in <^ County 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as : 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and : 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually 
and as personal representative 
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN : 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and 
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of 
WAYNE NAY, : Appeal No. 910244 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
VS. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC : 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF C. BEN BASYE 
STATE OF MISSOURI ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF HOWARD ) 
C. Ben Basye being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am over 21 years of age and am a resident of 
Howard County, State of Missouri. 
2. I am currently a Professor of Engineering Mechanics, 
University of Missouri-Rolla Graduate Engineering Center of St. 
Louis. I have received a Phd. in Engineering Mechanics from Iowa 
State University; my minors were Mechanical Engineering and 
Mathematics from the same institution. 
3. To exert 200 foot-pounds of torque on a steering 
wheel, 14 inches in diameter, which is similar to the Nay vehicle, 
one would have to push up with 171 pounds with one hand and down 
with 171 pounds with the other hand in the opposite direction. 
(171 pounds) times (14/12 feet) = 200 foot-pounds 
It is false to state that the average male can do thisl 
4. It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle accident was 
most probably caused by a rock or other foreign object becoming 
lodged in the pinch points associated with the exposed proximity of 
the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, preventing the 
driver from steering the vehicle. 
5. Beginning in 1988, General Motors trucks including 
Chevrolet pickup trucks, have been redesigned wherein corrective 
action has been taken to overcome the problem discussed in 
paragraph four. 
6. Specifically, General Motors has placed a plastic 
shield over the exposed region of the flexible coupling and the end 
retainer nut. This plastic shield, by preventing foreign objects 
from becoming lodged in the pinch points, will help eliminate the 
defect which existed on the Nay vehicle. 
7. The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge 
and if asked as a witness, I could and would testify to the same. 
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,fv DATED this Zt} day of September, 1991. 
In the County of Howard, State of Missouri, dii this £D 
day of September, 1991, before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared C. Ben Basye who is personally know to me to be 
the person whose name is signed on the preceding document in my 
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is 
voluntary and the document truthful. 
My Commission Expires: Notary^u&Iic 
Residing in \\TLC\xrO(_ 1M County 
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TabQ 
Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315 
John Edward Hansen, No. 4590 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
13 6 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MARISSAN NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN GALLEGHER, 
JOAN NAY and JALYNN NAY, the heirs 
of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF C. BEN 
BASYE 
Civil No. C 88-6114 
C. Ben Basye, Ph.D., P.E., upon being duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am over 21 years of age and am a resident of Howard 
County, State of Missouri. 
2. I am currently a Professor of Engineering Mechanics, 
University of Missouri-Rolla Graduate Engineering Center of St. 
Louis and a consulting engineer. 
3. I have received a Ph.D. in Engineering Mechanics from 
Iowa State University; my minors were Mechanical Engineering and 
Mathematics from the same institution. 
4. The Saginaw steering system used in the 1986 GMC High 
Sierra pickup truck driven by Wayne Nay (hereinafter the "Nay" 
vehicle) was mechanically and functionally essentially 
equivalent to the steering system used in the 3,707,064 General 
Motors automobiles which were recalled in 1973 (NHTSA Recall 
Campaign No. 73-0013). 
5. There existed pinch points on the Nay vehicle's 
steering system that constituted the same potential hazard which 
led to the recall of the 3,707,064 General Motors cars in 1973. 
6. It is my opinion that the Nay vehicle accident was most 
probably caused by a rock or other foreign object becoming lodged 
in the pinch points associated with the exposed proximity of the 
flexible coupling and the end retainer nut, preventing the driver 
from steering the vehicle. 
7. The steering parts on the NHTSA Recall (No. 73-0013) 
cars and the Nay's GMC vehicle are functionally equivalent, 
resulting in the same potential hazard; namely a pinch point 
between a part that must rotate and a fixed part preventing the 
driver from steering the vehicle. 
8. I am familiar with the design and potential defects of 
the 1973 recall campaign vehicles. 
9. In my opinion, the critical safety issue involved in 
the 1973 recall campaign is the existence of pinch points coupled 
with the possibility that foreign objects can be thrown into the 
area of the pinch points• 
10. It is my professional opinion that the method regarding 
how the foreign objects come into contact with the pinch points— 
whether the front cross member or the front tires throws the 
foreign objects into the pinch points—is only of secondary 
importance. 
11. Based on my experience as an engineer, it is my 
opinion that due to the design defect and resulting problems 
relative to the 1973 recall campaign vehicles, General Motors 
knew, or should have known, that the Nay truck suffered a similar 
design defect which allowed foreign objects to become lodged in 
the flexible coupling and thereby interfered with the steering 
capability of the vehicle. 
12. Because of the problems which led to the 1973 recall 
campaign, which resulted in the placing of a plastic shield over 
the flexible coupling on those vehicles, I believe that General 
Motors knew, or should have known, that a similar Problem could 
occur in trucks such as the Nay vehicle, and General Motors 
should have placed a plastic shield, or taken other corrective 
action, on those vehicles as well. 
13. In support for the above, I would note that beginning 
with the 1988 models and subsequent thereto, General Motors 
trucks including Chevrolet pick-up trucks have been redesigned 
wherein corrective action has been taken to overcome the 
potential problem discussed above. 
14. The foregoing facts are within my personal knowledge 
and if called as a witness, I could and would testify to the 
same. 
DATED t h i s 31 day of ftu;0Lsf 1990. 
c"! rien -Bayaa- "&ojSf j&u 
In the County of Howard, State of Missouri, on this 3} 
day of facuuij^l— , 1990, before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared C. Ben Bayse who is personally known to me to 
be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document in 
my presence and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is 
voluntary and the document truthful. 
C 3 J ^ ^ Notary-S i g n a t u r e a/ 
E x p i r a t i o n Date fjL^jif-*?{) 
